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CASE COMMENT
Constitutional Law-SPEECH-FLORIDA'S INDECENT AND OBSCENE
LANGUAGE STATUTE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE FOR
OVERBREADTH-Spears v. State, 337 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1976).
A Wakulla County Sheriffs deputy answered a disturbance call
at Evan's Pool Hall on October 26, 1975. Upon pulling into the area
of the pool hall, he heard Blannie Mae Spears cursing "in a loud and
angry manner."' He arrested her and charged her with publicly
using "indecent or obscene language, to wit: SON OF A BITCH,
BASTARD M.F. ETC, [sic] contrary to section 847.05, FLORIDA
STATUTES." ' 2 The statute provided: "Any person who shall pub-
licly use or utter any indecent or obscene language shall be guilty
''3of a misdemeanor ....
In Wakulla County Court Ms. Spears sought dismissal of the
charge on the ground that the statute was an unconstitutional
abridgment of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the first and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. After
the court rejected the motion, she pled nolo contendere to the charge
of using obscene language.4 The court judged her guilty of "the
offense of profanity" and fined her thirty-six dollars.'
On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reconsidered a pre-
vious decision upholding the constitutionality of section 847.05.1
Reexamining the statute in light of recent United States Supreme
Court decisions, the Florida court found the statute in Spears
"unconstitutional on its face, because it is overbroad at best."7 Al-
though Florida statutes regulating speech and conduct have been
challenged on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth, Spears was
apparently the first case in which the Florida Supreme Court invali-
dated such a statute exclusively on the ground of overbreadth.
Initially this comment will survey the general principles of vague-
ness and overbreadth as applied by the United States and Florida
Supreme Courts. Next, the Florida court's utilization of the doctrine
1. Transcript of trial at 3, Spears v. State, 337 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1976).
2. Spears v. State, 337 So. 2d 977, 978 n.2 (Fla. 1976).
3. FLA. STAT. § 847.05 (1977).
4. Transcript of trial at 3, Spears v. State, 337 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1976).
5. Id. at 4.
6. Jones v. State, 293 So. 2d 33 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1081 (1974) (want of a
properly presented federal question).
7. 337 So. 2d at 980 (footnote omitted).
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of overbreadth as a sole ground for invalidating a statute will be
analyzed. The comment will conclude with a discussion of the con-
flicting policies involved in declaring a statute unconstitutional and
with a suggestion for future application of the overbreadth doctrine
in Florida.
Both the Federal and Florida Constitutions protect speech.8 But
free speech is not an absolute right In 1919, for example, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote: "The most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
theatre and causing a panic."' 0 The United States Supreme Court
also has allowed states and municipalities to prohibit the use of
words that tend to incite lawless action ("fighting words")," to libel
or slander, 2 or to be obscene. 3 The restrictions of the Florida Su-
preme Court on speech parallel those of the United States Supreme
Court."'
8. U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
9. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); accord, Stephens v. Stickel, 200 So. 396, 398 (Fla. 1941).
There is a school of thought, led by former Justices Black and Douglas, that the first
amendment is "absolute" in that no law which abridges the freedom of speech is constitution-
ally valid. The leading statements of this position may be found in their dissenting opinions
in Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 78 (1961); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 508 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579 (1951). See also Cahn, Justice
Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 549 (1962);
Meiklejohn, Public Speech in the Burger Court: The Influence of Mr. Justice Black, 8 U. TOL.
L. REv. 301 (1977); Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HAttv. L. REv.
673 (1963).
10. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
11. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
12. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374 (1967).
13. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
Although the Court has consistently held that obscene speech is not protected by the first
amendment, the test for obscenity has changed. At common law, profanity, as such, was not
an offense. But where the spoken vulgarity amounted to "[acts of gross and open indecency
or obscenity, injurious to public morals," it was punishable as a common law crime. Winters
v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948).
The standard for obscenity was set out by the Court in Roth. The Court said there that
"sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with sex
in a manner appealing to prurient interest." 354 U.S. at 487 (footnote omitted).
The Court modified the Roth test in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the
Court said the test for obscenity includes determining (1) whether the average person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards, would find that, when taken as a whole, the material
appeals to the prurient interest, (2) whether the material depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable state law as written or con-
strued, and (3) whether the material, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political
or scientific value. Id. at 24.
As a result of Roth and Miller, speech that violates the three-part test may be regulated
as obscene.
14. Se'e,'e.g., State v. Saunders, 339 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1976) (fighting words or words like
shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre); White v. State, 330 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1976) (profanity in
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Statutes regulating speech must be carefully drafted, for the gov-
ernment can regulate speech only with narrow specificity. I" Two
tests may be used to measure the constitutionality of a statute
regulating speech: vagueness and overbreadth.
To avoid being declared void for vagueness, a statute which for-
bids or requires the doing of an act must be clear and precise.
Persons of common intelligence should not have to guess at the
statute's meaning or differ as to its application."6 This basic doctrine
is founded on the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution. 7 Vague laws are unconstitutional because they
''may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning,'' 8 may allow
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and, as a result, may
cause persons to alter their conduct and speech so as to avoid the
questionable area."
Yet, however clearly and precisely a statute is drafted, it may still
be declared unconstitutional on its face if it is overbroad. 0 Over-
breadth occurs when a statute regulating only spoken words can be
construed to go beyond regulating unprotected speech. The danger
in an overbroad statute is that it gives a police officer discretion to
arrest a person for uttering words that are protected under the
constitution. As a result, an overbroad statute has a "chilling
effect" on speech: persons voluntarily restrict what they say for
fear that what they say could, in the ears of a police officer, be
considered illegal.2'
The United States Supreme Court has strictly applied the over-
breadth doctrine. The Court has a much lower tolerance of statutes
restricting speech alone than of statutes regulating speech and con-
duct. In Gooding v. Wilson,22 the Court said that a statute punishing
spoken words could withstand attack upon its facial constitution-
ality "only if, as authoritatively construed by the [state] courts, it
is not susceptible of application to speech, although vulgar or offen-
sive, that is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
. ".."23 The Georgia statute under attack in that case provided:
a public place that would necessarily incite a breach of the public peace); State v. Beasley,
317 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1975) (speech that incites a riot); Tracey v. State, 130 So. 2d 605 (Fla.
1961) (obscene speech).
15. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
16. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
17. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 752 (1974) (fifth amendment); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360 (1964) (fourteenth amendment) (dealt with a state statute).
18. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (footnote omitted).
19. Id. at 108-09.
20. See, e.g., id. at 114-15; Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
21. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,614 (1971) (rights of free assembly
and association).
22. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
23. Id. at 520 (citations omitted).
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"Any person who shall, without provocation, use to or of another,
and in his presence . . .opprobrious words or abusive language,
tending to cause a breach of the peace . . . shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor."24 The Court declared the statute unconstitutional
for overbreadth because state courts had not narrowed its reach to
apply only to "fighting words"-words "which by their very utter-
ance . . tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." 5
A year after Gooding, the Court said that it would use a less
rigorous test for overbreadth where speech and conduct were inter-
twined. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,26 the Court said that before a
statute could be declared unconstitutional on its face for over-
breadth, the overbreadth "must not only be real, but substantial as
well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." '
In Broadrick the Court upheld against an overbreadth challenge an
Oklahoma merit system statute that prohibited state employees
from soliciting political contributions or participating in the man-
agement of campaigns. 2 1
The more recent-and perhaps the more significant-applica-
tions of the doctrine of overbreadth by the Court have been to
municipal ordinances. In Plummer v. City of Columbus, 9 a cab
driver cursed a woman passenger after she criticized him for
driving past the address she wanted.30 He was convicted under an
24. Id. at 519 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6303). The Georgia Legislature in 1974
amended its abusive obscene language statute to make a person who commits the following
act guilty of a misdemeanor:
Without provocation, uses to or of another, in his presence, opprobrious or abu-
sive words which by their very utterance tend to incite to an immediate breach of
the peace; that is to say, words which as a matter of common knowledge and under
ordinary circumstances will, when used to or of another person in his presence,
naturally tend to provoke violent resentment, that is, words commonly called fight-
ing words.
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2610 (Supp. 1976). A Georgia appellate court has sustained under the
new statute the conviction of a bouncer who, without provocation, told a deputy sheriff to
"[g]et your ass off before I throw it off." Allen v. State, 222 S.E.2d 856, 858 (Ga. App. 1975).
But the new statute's constitutionality has not been tested in a federal court.
25. 405 U.S. at 525 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. at 572 (1942)).
26. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
27. Id. at 615.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan maintained that the Court was narrowing the
doctrine by adding the word "substantial." A requirement of substantial overbreadth was
"already implicit in the doctrine," he said. Id. at 630.
For a discussion of the procedural and substantive aspects of the overbreadth doctrine, see
Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844 (1970). A recent
collection of cases dealing with the overbreadth doctrine may be found in Annot., 45 L. Ed.
2d 725 (1976).
28. 413 U.S. at 609-18.
29. 414 U.S. 2 (1973).
30. Id. at 3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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ordinance which provided that "[n]o person shall abuse another by
using menacing, insulting, slanderous, or profane language."', The
Court applied the Gooding test and found the ordinance vague as
well as overbroad." In Lewis v. City of New Orleans,33 a woman who
addressed officers as "you god damn m.f. police" after they arrested
her son 34 was convicted of violating an ordinance that made it un-
lawful for "any person wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene
or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of
the city police while in the actual performance of his duty. ' 35 The
Court used the Gooding test in declaring the ordinance unconstitu-
tionally overbroad .3
The doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth are not always clearly
differentiated by the Court. 37 Vagueness deals with the precision of
a statute, while overbreadth relates to the sweep of the statute. The
overbreadth doctrine has been applied primarily in the first amend-
ment area, while vagueness has been applied frequently to criminal
statutes lacking clarity or precision .3 Both vague and overbroad
statutes deter protected activity. But a statute may pass the test for
vagueness (be clear and precise), yet fail the test for overbreadth
(reach protected speech or activity).
Statutes that suffer from vagueness or overbreadth may be cured
by restrictive interpretation.39 The construction given by the state
court must, however, regulate only unprotected speech: words that
could incite a breach of the public peace ("fighting words")40 or that
could be slanderous or libelous. 4 Where the state statute's construc-
tion has not been so narrowed, the United States Supreme Court
will declare the statute overbroad and therefore unconstitutional on
its face.42
The Court signaled its approval of the application of the restric-
tive construction doctrine to a speech statute in 1942 in Chaplinsky
31. Id. at 2 (quoting COLUMBUS, OHIO, CITY CODE § 2327.03).
32. Id. at 2-3.
33. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
34. Id. at 131 n.1.
35. Id. at 131-32 (quoting NEW ORLEANS, LA., OaDINAN.CE 828 M.C.S. § 49-7).
36. 415 U.S. at 134.
37. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
38. For a recent compilation of cases on overbreadth, see Annot., 45 L. Ed. 2d 725, 738
(1976).
39. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91 (1965).
Only state courts have jurisdiction to provide the authoritative construction for a state
statute. United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971).
40. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
41. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
42. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
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v. New Hampshire.4 3 Chaplinsky was convicted of violating a New
Hampshire statute that provided:
No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word
to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public
place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any
noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to
deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his
lawful business or occupation."
Chaplinsky, on a public sidewalk near the entrance to the Rochester
city hall, told the city marshal, "'You are a God damned racketeer'
and a 'damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are
Fascists or agents of Fascists.' "'I The Supreme Court upheld Chap-
linsky's conviction because the New Hampshire courts had re-
stricted the statute to apply only to areas of unprotected speech:
words likely to cause an average addressee to fight."
Spears v. State was the Florida Supreme Court's first use of the
doctrine of overbreadth as an exclusive ground for striking down a
speech statute as unconstitutional on its face. Florida statutes regu-
lating speech and conduct have been challenged in the past as over-
broad and vague, but the court has either refused to consider the
issue 7 or said that the statute was not overbroad.8 When faced with
a constitutional challenge on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth,
43. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
44. Id. at 569 (quoting PuBuc LAws N.H. ch. 378, § 2 (1926)).
45. Id. at 569.
46. Id. at 573. The Court said that New Hampshire courts had required both (1) a face-
to-face confrontation and (2) expression of the fighting words "plainly likely to cause a breach
of the peace by the addressee" before a person could be convicted under the statute. Id.
47. On the other hand, where property rights were concerned, the Florida Supreme Court
invalidated vague and broadly worded statutes on the ground they were an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power. In Sarasota County v. Barg, 302 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1974), the
court held invalid portions of a statute creating a conservation district that prohibited "undue
or unreasonable dredging, filling or disturbance of submerged bottoms." The statute also
banned "unreasonable destruction of natural vegetation." According to the court, the prohi-
bitions were unconstitutional because the legislature failed to provide guidelines for their
enforcement. Id. at 742. The court cited Conner v. Joe Hatton, Inc., 216 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1968),
for the rule:
When [a] statute is couched in vague and uncertain terms or is so broad in scope
that no one can say with certainty, from the terms of the law itself, what would be
deemed an infringement of the law, it must be held unconstitutional as attempting
to grant to the administrative body the power to say what the law shall be.
Id. at 211 (emphasis in original). In Conner, the Florida court invalidated sections of a statute
that gave the agriculture commissioner power to remove trade barriers and to prohibit unfair
trade practices. Id. at 213.
48. See, e.g., State v. Beasley, 317 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1975) (restrictive construction); State
v. Mayhew, 288 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1974); City of St. Petersburg v. Waller, 261 So. 2d 151 (Fla.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972).
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the court has taken one of four approaches: declared the statute void
for vagueness, declared the statute unconstitutional as applied, re-
strictively construed the statute to fall within constitutional bound-
aries, or declared it constitutional.
The Florida test for vagueness was outlined in 1934 in Brock v.
Hardie:9 "Whether the words of the Florida statute are significantly
explicit to inform those who are subject to its provisions what con-
duct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is the test
by which the statute must stand or fall . . . ."0 It is not necessary,
however, that the statute provide explicit details such as charts or
specifications of the conduct forbidden for it to be unconstitu-
tional."
The Florida Supreme Court has used the Brock v. Hardie2 vague-
ness test to declare unconstitutional, for example, the Florida
"crimes against nature" statute5 as well as a statute forbidding
49. 154 So. 690 (Fla. 1934).
50. Id. at 694.
51. Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State ex rel. Powell, 262 So. 2d 881, 884 (Fla. 1972).
52. 154 So. 690, 694 (Fla. 1934).
53. In Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971), the court invalidated FLA. STAT. §
800.01 (1969), the sodomy law, which provided: "Whoever commits the abominable and
detestable crime against nature, either with mankind or with beast, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding twenty years." Act of Aug. 6, 1868, ch. 1,637,
sub-ch. 8, § 17, 1868 Fla. Laws 61 (repealed 1974). The court urged the legislature to review
immediately other sex offense statutes to cure their vagueness. 257 So. 2d at 24.
The next year the court held that the Florida abortion statutes, sections 782.10 and 797.01
(1971), violated the United States and Florida Constitutions. State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d
431 (Fla. 1972). The statutes provided:
782.10 Abortion.-Every person who shall administer to any woman pregnant
with a quick child any medicine, drug or substance whatever, or shall use or employ
any instrument or other means, with intent thereby to destroy such child, unless
the same shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such mother, or shall have
been advised by two physicians to be necessary for such purpose, shall, in case the
death of such child or of such mother be thereby produced, be deemed guilty of
manslaughter.
Act of Aug. 6, 1868, ch. 1,637, sub-ch. 3, § 11, 1868 Fla. Laws 61 (repealed 1972).
797.01 Performing abortion; punishment.-Whoever with intent to procure mis-
carriage of any woman unlawfully administers to her, or advises or prescribes for
her, or causes to be taken by her, any poison, drug, medicine or other noxious thing,
or unlawfully uses any instrument or other means whatever with the like intent, or
with intent aids or assists therein, shall, if the woman does riot die in consequence
thereof, be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding seven years,
or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars.
Id. sub-ch. 8, § 9 (repealed 1972).
The court cited Franklin and the vagueness test-a statute must inform the average person
of common intelligence what is prohibited. The court said that the clause" 'unless the same
shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such mother' is incapable of certain interpre-
tation. The duty, and judgment of a physician, the necessity and welfare of the patient, and
the rights of both, cannot be subjected to indefinite, uncertain, vague, or unreasonable legis-
lation." 262 So. 2d at 438. Both statutes were so indefinite "as to afford no fair warning as to
what conduct might trangress them." Id.
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certain public officers or employees from accepting "other employ-
ment which might impair his independence of judgment in the per-
formance of his public duties." 5'
At times, the Florida court has avoided the issue of whether a
statute was void for vagueness by declaring it unconstitutional as
applied to a specific set of facts. In Gonzales v. City of Belle Glade55
the court said the Florida disorderly conduct statute" could not be
used to convict protest marchers who used "an intemperate exple-
tive or two" that annoyed bystanders. The court found no evidence
of physical threats to police officers or of any violation of the statute.
A violation "requires more than the creation of a, mere annoy-
ance." . The statute was unconstitutional as applied:
In order for the statute to be constitutionally applied, it must be
proved that some act on the part of the accused either corrupted
the public morals, outraged the sense of public decency, affected
the peace and quiet of persons who witnessed the conduct of the
accused, or that the accused engaged in brawling or fighting, or
engaged in conduct constituting a breach of the peace or disorderly
conduct.
57
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Boyd said the statute was facially
vague and overbroad. 58
In In re Fuller,59 a 16-year-old high school student was convicted
54. FLA. STAT. § 112.313(6) (1969) was struck down in State v. Llopis, 257 So. 2d 17 (Fla.
1971), on the same day the court issued Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21. The statute provided:
"No officer or employee of a state agency, or of a county, city or other political subdivision
of the state, or any legislator or legislative employee shall accept other employment which
might impair his independence of judgment in the performance of his public duties." Act of
July 5, 1969, ch. 69-335, § 2, 1969 Fla. Laws 1167 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 112.313(7)
(1977)).
Cf. D'Alemberte v. Anderson, 349 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1977). In D'Alemberte the court found
FLA. STAT. § 112.313(1) (Supp. 1974), unconstitutional. This statute provided:
ACCEPTANCE OF GIFTS PROHIBITED.-No officer or employee of a state
agency or of a county, city, or other political subdivision of the state, legislator, or
legislative employee shall accept any gift, favor, or service, of value to the recipient,
that would cause a reasonably prudent person to be influenced in the discharge of
official duties.
Act of June 12, 1974, ch. 74-177, § 3, 1974 Fla. Laws 467 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
112.313(2) (1977)). The court said that the phrase "that would cause a reasonably prudent
person to be influenced in the discharge of official duties" suffered from vagueness.
55. 287 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1973).
56. Act of June 15, 1971, ch. 71-136, § 718, 1971 Fla. Laws 552 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
877.03 (1977)).
56.1. 287 So. 2d at 670.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 675.
59. 255 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1971).
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of disorderly conduct for using the phrase "mother f ..... " in an
altercation over placement of a Negro History Week poster at North
Fort Myers High School. Calling it a "tempest in a teapot," the
court reversed the conviction. It was unclear whether the last half
of the phrase "mother f ..... " was used by the youth. No one was
"disturbed" within the meaning of the statute. Therefore, the court
determined the statute to be unconstitutionally applied."0 In neither
Gonzalez nor Fuller did the court reach the issue of whether the
statute was unconstitutional on its face.
Where a statute has been deemed susceptible to an interpretation
that would render it unconstitutionally vague, either by the Florida
court's own analysis or by that of a federal court, the Florida court
has felt obligated to use the restrictive construction doctrine" to
remedy the constitutional ill. In State v. Beasley,2 the Florida court
held the state riot statute3 constitutional after outlining strict re-
quirements to be met in proving a violation of the statute. After
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declared the
Florida breach of the peace and disorderly conduct statute5 uncon-
stitutional in Weigand v. Seaver,"6 the Florida court held the statute
constitutional subject to a limited construction set forth in White
v. State:"7
We hold that mere words, used as a tool of communication, are
constitutionally protected. The protection fails only when 1) by the
manner of their use, the words invade the right of others to pursue
their lawful activities, or 2) by their very utterance, they inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. 6
White, his mother, and a friend had entered a police substation to
provide bail for his father, who had been arrested and brought to
60. Id. at 4.
61. The doctrine, recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91 (1965), is that a state court may construe a statute so
as to bring it within constitutional limits. The Florida court outlined its view of the doctrine
in State v. Beasley, 317 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1975): "We have a responsibility to avoid a holding
of unconstitutionality if a fair construction of the statute can be made within constitutional
limits." Id. at 752.
62. 317 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1975).
63. Act of June 15, 1971, ch. 71-136, § 1125, 1971 Fla. Laws 552 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
870.01(2) (1977)).
64. 317 So. 2d at 753.
65. Act of June 15, 1971, ch. 71-136, § 1147, 1971 Fla. Laws 552 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
877.03 (1977)).
66. 504 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1974).
67. 330 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1976).
68. Id. at 7.
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the substation earlier. White "demanded his father's immediate
release on bail saying, 'I want to get my fucking father, and I come
to get him right now.' " After he was told it would require fifteen to
twenty minutes to complete the paperwork involved in the booking
procedure, White "'went-almost-into a fit,' and . . . was
'screaming at the top of his lungs.' He continued 'screaming at the
top of his lungs, using all sorts of language and calling' the officers
'mother-fucking pigs' for several minutes." After being asked re-
peatedly but unsuccessfully to modify his conduct, was arrested. He
resisted and was charged with disorderly conduct and resisting ar-
rest with violence. 6
The Florida court said the problem in White was not with the
substance of the speech. "It is the degree of loudness and the cir-
cumstances in which [the words] are uttered, which takes them out
of the constitutionally protected area. Indeed, [White's] conduct
would have been equally disorderly had he merely recited 'Mary had
a little lamb' in the same tone and under similar circumstances."70
Because the trial court did not have the benefit of this restrictive
construction when it tried White, the case was remanded for recon-
sideration in light of the court's test.
After the Florida Second District Court of Appeal found a St.
Petersburg municipal ordinance prohibiting "verbal abuse" of po-
lice officers unconstitutionally overbroad,7 the Florida Supreme
Court, in City of St. Petersburg v. Waller,72 upheld the ordinance
as constitutional, construing the "verbal acts prohibited as strictly
limited to words having a direct tendency to cause acts of violence
. Waller, the leader of a black militant group, used a mega-
phone to call a policeman "Pig. White pig. Sooey, sooey." After the
police arrested him, a scuffle broke out and Waller "continued
cursing, yelling, spitting on the officers and yelling 'White M ----
F ---', and similar obscenities. 7 4 The court found the word
"pig" to be a verbal brickbat, a fighting word, hurled through
Waller's megaphone.7 5
A statute similar to the one at issue in Spears was restrictively
construed by the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Mayhew."7 The
Florida statute provided: "Whoever, having arrived at the age of
69. Id. at 4-5.
70. Id. at 7.
71. Waller v. City of St. Petersburg, 245 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
72. 261 So. 2d 151 (Fla.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972).
73. Id. at 158.
74. Id. at 153.
75. Id. at 159.
76. 288 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1974).
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discretion, uses profane, vulgar and indecent language, in any pub-
lic place; or upon the private premises of another, or so near thereto
"177
as to be heard by another, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ... ,
A lower court had found the statute impermissibly vague and un-
constitutional for overbreadth. The Florida Supreme Court said the
language sought to be proscribed by the statute is "that which
would necessarily incite a breach of the peace."7 8 These included
"'fighting words'-words that could include a breach of the peace.
Profane and obscene revilings are included in this category."' 7' Since
the context in which Mayhew had used the words "mother f- .....
was not known, the court could not determine if his language was
proscribed by the statute. 0
The Florida Supreme Court has strained to uphold statutes re-
quiring decent speech and conduct. In Chesebrough v. State,"' the
court upheld the constitutionality of a statute making it a crime to
commit any "lewd and lascivious act" in the presence of a child
under the age of 14. The court sustained the conviction of a man and
wife who performed intercourse in front of their child to demon-
strate how adults reproduce. The court said that the words "lewd"
and "lascivious" had been defined in the past with sufficient explic-
itness that an ordinary person would know what conduct was pro-
hibited.82 In Bell v. State,3 the Florida Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Florida statutes making it a crime for any per-
son to commit "any unnatural and lascivious act with another per-
son"8 4 or to cause a minor under eighteen years to become a delin-
quent or dependent child.85 The state's disorderly conduct statute"
was held constitutional in State v. Magee.87 The court said that the
test of common understanding was met by the statute's language:
77. Act of June 15, 1971, ch. 71-136, § 1056, 1971 Fla. Laws 552 (codified at FIA. STAT. §
847.04 (1977)).
78. 288 So. 2d at 251.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 255 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1971).
82. Id. at 677-78.
83. 289 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1973).
84. Act of June 15, 1971, ch. 71-136, § 778, 1971 Fla. Laws 552 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
800.02 (1977)).
85. Id. § 957 (repealed 1974).
86. Id. § 1147 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 877.03 (1977)).
87. 259 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1972).
The Florida court used the Magee decision as part of its basis for upholding the conviction
of two women charged with violating the statute by sunbathing topless on a public beach.
The women had attacked the disorderly conduct doctrine statute as unconstitutionally vague.
Moffett v. State, 340 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 1976).
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Whoever commits such acts as are of a nature or corrupt the
public morals, or outrage the sense of public decency, or affect the
peace and quiet of persons who may witness them, or engages in
brawling or fighting, or engages in such conduct as to constitute a
breach of the peace or disorderly conduct, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor . . ..
The court reversed the trial court's dismissal of charges against
Coleen Magee for "lying on front seat of car with her pants down
and her buttocks exposed" and Michael Nunziata for "lying on front
seat of car with his pants pulled down and his penis in plain view
from exterior of car . .8.9."" The court said that "[sluch exposure
before the public is clearly calculated to corrupt the public morals
and outrage the sense of public decency which is prohibited by the
statute and any person of common intelligence would be perfectly
aware that it was."90
The Florida Legislature may have been filled with such a "sense
of public decency" when it enacted the following law on January 24,
1881:
Any person who shall publicly use or utter any indecent or ob-
scene language shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon
conviction thereof shall be fined in a sum not to exceed twenty-five
dollars, or be imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding thirty
days, in the discretion of the court.9 1
Except for modifications of the penalty, the law remained in effect
for more than ninety-five years.92
The law, which eventually became section 847.05 of the Florida
Statutes, was untested 3 before its constitutionality was challenged
in 1974 before the Florida Supreme Court in Jones v. State.9' Jones
was arrested for after using the words "G-- D---- Mother F ------
F ---- Pigs and Son of a B .... " in addressing police officers.,'
88. Act of June 15, 1971, ch. 71-136, § 1147, 1971 Fla. Laws 552 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
877.03 (1977)).
89. 259 So. 2d at 141.
90. Id.
91. Act of Jan. 24, 1881, ch. 3284, 1881 Fla. Laws 87 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 847.05
(1977)).
92. Whether it was the result of inflation or an increased "sense of public decency" by
the Florida Legislature, the penalty increased over those 95 years from a maximum fine of
$25 or a jail term of up to 30 days in 1881 to a maximum fine of $500 or a jail term of up to
60 days in 1976. FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(4)(b),, .083(1)(e) (1977).
93. The Florida Supreme Court had not directly confronted the issue of the constitution-
ality of § 847.05 until Jones v. State, 293 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1974).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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Following the initial arrest for indecent language, Jones was ar-
rested for resisting arrest with violence and for possession of less
than five grams of marijuana. At the trial, Jones challenged the
statute under which he was initially arrested-section 847.05-and
the search and seizure of marijuana that resulted.
The trial court upheld the constitutionality of the indecent lan-
guage statute, but Jones was convicted of possession of marijuana
alone." On appeal, he challenged section 847.05 as being overbroad,
citing Gooding97 and Chaplinsky.95 Writing for the court, Justice
McCain ignored the doctrine of overbreadth in upholding the stat-
ute's constitutionality. "No distortion of the Constitution (State or
United States) should prevent our Legislature from keeping its peo-
ple free from obscene and foul language."99 The court used the test
for vagueness in determining whether the statute was overbroad,
concluding that it was "not void for overbreadth, but to the con-
trary, contains language sufficient to convey to a person of common
understanding its prohibition.' '00 The court's application of the
vagueness test to the issue of overbreadth-whether a statute is
susceptible of application to protected speech-created additional
confusion in Florida law.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Ervin correctly criticized his col-
leagues for ignoring the United States Supreme Court's Gooding
test-whether the statute was carefully drawn or authoritatively
construed to punish only unprotected speech and was not suscepti-
ble of application to protected expression. Justice Ervin chided his
colleagues: "Actually, the majority opinion is little more than a
parochial ipse dixit conclusion expressing personal prejudice that
indecent language spoken in public in and of itself is a crime, and
may be condemned by vague legislation."10' Ervin said the statute
should have been narrowed by restricting it to references to sexual
acts of a prurient nature, or indicating any clear and present danger
of harm to others.'02
96. Id.
97. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
98. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
99. 293 So. 2d at 34.
100. Id.
101. Id. Justice Ervin was supported in his Jones dissent by at least one other Florida
judge. Chief Judge Robert Mann of the Florida Second District Court of Appeal called the
Jones v. State decision "clearly and directly contrary to Gooding v. Wilson." Canney v. State,
298 So. 2d 495, 502 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (Mann, C.J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing).
102. 293 So. 2d at 35.
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The United States Supreme Court dismissed Jones' appeal' 3 "for
want of properly presented federal question."''0 However, Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, dissented, say-
ing that the statute should be declared unconstitutional on its face
because it violated the Gooding test; that is, it was not limited in
its application "to punish[ing] only unprotected speech" but was
"susceptible of application to protected expression.' '0 In Spears,
the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged the recent history of
Jones'°0 and Bucolo v. State'°7 and said that a reconsideration of the
constitutionality of section 847.05 was necessary.'0 The court used
the Gooding test to declare section 847.05 unconstitutional on its
face for overbreadth.10 Justice Hatchett, writing for the court, said
this action was necessary because the statute, by failing to articu-
late a clear boundary between protected and unprotected speech,
prohibited conduct which was protected under the United States
103. Jones v. Florida, 419 U.S. 1081 (1974).
104. Id. In his dissent to the dismissal of appeal, Justice Brennan interpreted the major-
ity's view to be that the federal question was not properly before the Court "because appellant
was convicted not for violating § 847.05 but on the marihuana charge." 419 U.S. at 1083-84.
In Brennan's view, the appeal could be dismissed only "if the federal claim had not been
raised in a proper and timely manner in the state courts." Id. at 1083 (citations omitted).
Jones raised the issue of the speech statute's constitutionality "at every level in the state
proceedings." Id.
105. Id. at 1082 (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972)).
106. 419 U.S. 1081 (1974).
107. 303 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 927 (1975).
William Bucolo, Ronald Simpson, and James Agut were convicted in Palm Beach County
Circuit Court for publishing certain comic strips and pictures in violation of the Florida
obscenity statute, FLA. STAT. § 847.011 (1977). Bucolo and the others challenged the obscenity
statute as unconstitutional. But the Florida Supreme Court, in a five-paragraph per curiam
opinion, upheld the statute and the convictions on Oct. 16, 1974. 303 So. 2d at 330.
The United States Supreme Court took even less space to grant certiorari and reverse the
convictions. Bucolo v. Florida, 421 U.S. 927 (1975). The Court cited two cases as the basis
for its decision: Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), and Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229
(1972).
Shortly after Bucolo v. Florida, the Florida Supreme Court, in Bucolo v. State, 316 So. 2d
551 (Fla. 1975), remanded Bucolo to the trial court for application of the obscenity test in
Miller v. California, which is set out in note 13 supra.
But Bucolo and his codefendants did not want a retrial. They applied to the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, claiming that they had been denied the exoneration
to which they were entitled under Bucolo v. Florida. In Bucolo v. Adkins, 424 U.S. 641 (1976),
"the Court left no doubt that its unanimous decision in Bucolo v. Florida ... rested on the
ground that [the Florida Supreme] Court had erroneously upheld a conviction for constitu-
tionally protected activity, which fell within the purview of Section 847.011, Florida Statutes
(1975)." Spears v. State, 337 So. 2d 977, 979 n.4 (Fla. 1976).
With this footnote in Spears, the Florida Supreme Court indicated that the Bucolo deci-
sions had prompted it to examine speech and conduct statutes more carefully to determine
if they reached constitutionally protected activity.
108. 337 So. 2d 977, 979 (Fla. 1976).
109. Id. at 980.
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Constitution's first and fourteenth amendments."'
Although the Florida court reached a correct result in Spears, its
opinion was more cryptic than necessary. By following an intricate
line of reasoning, the court diplomatically reversed its recent hold-
ing in Jones. It considered-and rejected-the restrictive construc-
tion doctrine. Because the statute was already unconstitutionally
overbroad, the court did not have to consider the vagueness issue.",
And, since the United States Supreme Court in Bucolo had declared
unconstitutional similar words-"indecent" and "obscene"-in a
related section in chapter 847, the words "indecent and obscene" in
section 847.05 were likewise unconstitutional.
It appeared that the court used either a form of stare decisis or,
the statutory construction doctrine of in pari materia in defining the
words "indecent" and "obscene" in section 847.05. Under the doc-
trine of in pari materia the court can look to the judicial interpreta-
tion of similar terms within the same or related statutes for aid in
determining the meaning of the terms under scrutiny."' 2 This
method of judicial construction enables the court to clarify a vague
or overbroad statute rather than to strike it.
In Spears the court was very careful to point out that section
847.011, the statute attacked in Buculo, appeared in the same chap-
ter as section 847.05." '3 Moreover, section 847.011 contained the
words "indecent" and "obscene." When Bucolo invalidated 847.011,
it invalidated section 847.05 as well.' 4 There was no viable distinc-
tion between Bucolo and Jones. Since Bucolo was decided in 1975,
a year after Jones, the court found a formal-and very valid-excuse
for reexamining its holding in Jones. Such intricate reasoning al-
lowed the court to overrule a decision of an earlier court without the
embarrassment of highlighting the error of the earlier tribunal.
The court explained that the restrictive construction doctrine
could not be used because the Jones court in 1974 expressly ruled
the statute constitutionally sound. Since the court must abide by
the authoritative construction at the time of the offense, it reasoned
that it could not have saved the statute by a retroactive restrictive
construction." 5 Such a narrowing would have created an ex post
110. Id. at 980-81.
111. Id. at 980 n.5.
112. Under the doctrine of in pari materia, statutes that relate to the same or a closely
allied subject may be compared with each other to the extent that an understanding of one
will aid in the interpretation of the other. SEE Golstein v. Acme Concrete Corp., 103 So. 2d
202, 204 (Fla. 1958); State ex rel. McClure v. Sullivan, 43 So. 2d 438, 441 (Fla. 1949). See
generally 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAD STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51 (4th ed. 1973).
113. 337 So. 2d at 979.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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facto law. The court concluded, somewhat cryptically, that it could
not narrow the reach of section 847.05 in Spears.
The court, in effect, rejected arguments made by the Florida At-
torney General that the court should read the Jones v. State deci-
sion in light of State v. Mayhew, which restrictively construed a
statute similar to section 847.05 to cover only "fighting words."",
Because Mayhew preceded Jones, and because the Mayhew decision
limited section 847.04, the state argued that Spears could have
fairly anticipated that section 847.05 would be similarly limited to
"fighting words." The court could authoritatively construe section
847.05 in the Spears case to mean fighting words and apply it to
Spears without engaging in retroactive lawmaking, the state con-
tended."7
The court also took the position that it was unnecessary to con-
sider the vagueness issue since the statute was unconstitutional
even if it were not vague.18 The court made no mention of prior
Florida decisions on vagueness. However, it did cite several United
States Supreme Court cases which demanded that statutes regulat-
ing speech alone meet a higher standard of exactness and clarity."9
In Spears the court implied that if the person challenging the
statute could hypothesize a situation in which the statute could
restrict protected speech, the statute would be overbroad. The court
enunciated the following strict rule for speech statutes:
"Consistently with the United States Supreme Court's decisions,
nobody can be punished under a statute purporting to outlaw spo-
ken words, if the statute would be unconstitutional as applied to
anybody. "120 The statute is unconstitutional even though it is not
overbroad as applied to the individual before the court.
116. Brief for Appellee at 3, Spears v. State, 337 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1976).
117. The State cited in its Spears brief the United States Supreme Court decision of Rose
v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975), for the proposition that a "foreseeable" judicial construction
does not constitute "retroactive lawmaking" and thereby a denial of due process. Locke, who
forced a female neighbor at knifepoint to submit to his twice performing cunnilingus on her,
was convicted of having committed a "crime against nature" in violation of the Tennessee
Code. Brief for Appellee at 3, Spears v. State, 337 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1976). The Court upheld
the Tennessee "crime against nature" statute against an attack of vagueness because a
Tennessee court had indicated in a previous decision that the statute was to be given a broad
meaning. The Tennessee statute did not specifically proscribe forced cunnilingus nor had the
Tennessee courts directly considered the question. The Court said it was enough that the
Tennessee court previously had included fellatio within the meaning of the statute and hinted
that cunnilingus might also be proscribed. Id. at 52-53.
However, the Florida Supreme Court may not have been persuaded by this argument
because the Florida "crimes against nature" statute was declared unconstitutionally vague
in Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971).
118. 337 So. 2d at 979, 980.
119. Id.
120. Id. (emphasis added).
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This rule was not adopted because the court condoned foul or
profane speech. "[O]ur principal concern here is preservation of
freedom of speech for all citizens. Overbroad statutes create the
danger that a citizen will be punished as a criminal for exercising
his right of free speech."'' 2' The court recognized the deterrent effect
of an overbroad statute declaring such a statute unconstitutional:
Tihe mere existence of statutes and ordinances purporting to
criminalize protected expression operates as a deterrent to the ex-
ercise of the rights of free expression, and deters most effectively
the prudent, the cautious and the circumspect, the very persons
whose advice we seem generally to be most in need of.'1
This explicit language should alert the Florida Legislature to the
need for precision in construing statutes that will regulate spoken
words.
Perhaps the major shortcoming of Spears is that the court did not
offer any guidelines for the future application of the doctrine of
overbreadth. Nor did the court state explicitly the order in which it
will consider the issues of vagueness, overbreadth, or restrictive con-
struction.
The history of the overbreadth doctrine in the Florida Supreme
Court since Spears indicates that members of the court disagree as
to when a statute involving first amendment freedoms should be
restrictively construed and when it should be declared unconstitu-
tional for overbreadth.
The Florida court imposed a restrictive construction on section
877.03 in State v. Saunders,'2 3
[slo that no words except "fighting words" or words like shouts
of "fire" in a crowded theatre fall within its proscription, in order
to avoid the constitutional problem of overbreadth and "the dan-
ger that a citizen will be punished as a criminal for exercising his
right of free speech.' ' 2
In Saunders an off-duty policeman sought to arrest Stephens, a
newspaper hawker who appeared to be annoying passersby. Saun-
ders intervened on behalf of the news peddler. Stephens was
charged with a "supposed violation" of the Florida breach of the
peace statute, section 877.03.121 Saunders was booked under section
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 339 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1976).
124. Id. at 644 (quoting Spears v. State, 337 So. 2d 977, 980 (Fla. 1976)).
125. Id. at 641. FLA. STAT. § 877.03 (1975), provided in pertinent part:
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843.01 for interfering with Stephen's allegedly lawful arrest.2 ' The
trial court granted a motion to dismiss the charge against Saunders
because it was predicated on an unconstitutional statute.", The
supreme court affirmed the dismissal of charges against Saunders
but held the breach of the peace statute constitutional, subject to
the narrowing construction. 2 Because attempts had been made ear-
lier to construe section 877.03 restrictively in White v. State,'2 the
court felt obligated to limit the statute's reach even more. 130 The
court noted that the statute also suffered from a "problem of vague-
ness with respect to which acts are proscribed"' 13' by the statute. But
the court said it would not decide the issue, reserving it for later
case-by-case adjudication. 3 2
In State v. Simpson,33 the Florida Supreme Court restrictively
construed the unlawful assembly statute, section 870.02, which pro-
Whoever commits such acts as are of a nature to corrupt the public morals, or
outrage the sense of public decency, or affect the peace and quiet of persons who
may witness them, or engages in brawling or fighting, or engages in such conduct
as to constitute a breach of the peace or disorderly conduct, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor ....
126. 339 So. 2d at 641. FLA. STAT. § 843.01 (1975), provided:
Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any sheriff, deputy
sheriff, officer of the Florida Highway Patrol, municipal police officer, beverage
enforcement agent, officer of the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, officer
of the Department of Natural Resources, any member of the Florida Parole and
Probation Commission or any administrative aide or supervisor employed by said
commission, any county probation officer or any personnel or representative of the
Department of [Criminal] Law Enforcement or other person legally authorized to
execute process, in the execution of legal process or in the lawful execution of any
legal duty, by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer or legally
authorized person, shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as
provided in a. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775. 084.
127. 339 So. 2d at 641.
128. Id. at 644.
129. 330 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1976).
130. 339 So. 2d at 643-44.
131. Id. at 644 (emphasis in original).
132. Id.
133. 347 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1977). In McCall v. State, 354 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1978), the Florida
Supreme Court held unconstitutional FLA. STAT. § 231.07 (1975) (repealed, Act of June 18,
1976, ch. 76- 168, § 3, 1976 Fla. Laws 295, effective July 1, 1982; presently codified at FLA.
STAT. § 231.07 (1977)), which makes one criminally liable "who upbraids, abuses, or insults
any member of the instructional staff on school property or in the presence of pupils at a
school activity." Mrs. McCall, upon being told by her daughter that she had been struck by
her teacher, immediately went to the school and confronted the teacher. "This confrontation
became a profane verbal attack upon the instructor and took place in the presence of at least
50 students." 354 So. 2d at 870. Mrs. McCall was charged with a violation of the statute. The
court, speaking through Justice Hatchett, said that while "[tihe interests sought to be
protected are worthy," id., the statute could not stand because it was not "narrowly tailored
to further the state's legitimate interests," and encompassed "speech protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 872. The court cited Spears as well as federal cases as
a basis for its decision.
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vides: "If three or more persons meet together to commit a breach
of the peace, or to do any other unlawful act, each of them shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor . . . . I" Four members of the court inter-
preted the statute to prohibit "(1) an assembly of three or more
persons who, (2) having a common unlawful purpose, (3) assemble
in such a manner as to give rational, firm, and courageous persons
in the neighborhood of the assembly a well-grounded fear of a
breach of the peace."'35 A fifth member of the court, Justice Sund-
berg, concurred, saying that he believed that the words "'or to do
any other unlawful act,' [in section 870.02] may not be constitu-
tionally prohibited due to the overbreadth inherent in such phrase
and consequent infringement on the protected freedom of speech
and assembly.' ' 3 But Justice Sundberg would have preferred that
the opinion explicitly state such a holding.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Boyd said he would have declared
the entire statute facially unconstitutional for overbreadth. "As the
statute is now drafted and construed, constitutionally protected
speech and association could be criminally punished."'137
Justice Hatchett, who wrote the Spears opinion, did not explain
his dissent in Simpson. However, because of his strong view in
Spears that a statute would be unconstitutional if it could be used
to reach any protected speech,'3 it may be fairly presumed that he
felt section 870.02 was unconstitutional on its face.
The Florida Supreme Court declared section 847.04 unconstitu-
tional in Brown v. State. 3 In Brown, police answered a call to Mark
Brown's father's house. Upon arrival, Brown got into the patrol car.
When requested by a patrolman to leave the car, Brown "replied he
was 'tired of the mother-f--' cause they weren't doing him right.'
Apparently [Brown] was referring to his by-standing father. After
the officer asked [Brown] to 'hold down the profane language,'
Brown enunciated similar distasteful comments about his father,
again in the presence of the patrolman."'' 0 Brown's comments were
not directed to anyone in particular, but he was arrested and
charged with "open profanity" because the policeman "'figured he
shouldn't be out there in public using words like that.' ""'
Brown entered a plea of nolo contendere in Polk County Court,
134. FLA. STAT. § 870.02 (1977).
135. 347 So. 2d at 415.
136. Id. at 416.
137. Id. at 417.
138. Spears v. State, 337 So. 977, 980 (Fla. 1976).
139. No. 50,559 (Fla. Feb. 9, 1978) (rehearing denied April 5, 1978).
140. Brown v. State, No. 50,559, slip op. at 2 (Fla. April 5, 1978).
141. Id.
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reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. But
he was found guilty, sentenced to time served (three days), and
fined twenty-five dollars.
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed State v.
Mayhew,4 1 the earlier decision upholding the constitutionality of
section 847.04. In Mayhew the court held that the statute was
"neither impermissibly vague nor unnecessarily overbroad." But
the court restricted the reach of the statute to language "which
would necessarily incite a breach of the peace."'
The Brown court said that it could not find any "statutory lan-
guage to support judicial restructuring." As a result, the court found
the statute "violative of Article I, Section 4, Florida constitution
and, consequently, incapable of redemption. This is so because men
of common understanding upon reading the statute would reasona-
bly conclude that mere utterance of the proscribed language, with-
out more, could subject them to prosecution.'
The court in effect adopted the view of Justice Ervin in Mayhew:
There are no saving words in our statute upon which this Court
can honestly state it is inoffensive to the First and Fourteenth
amendments. There was such a basis in the New Hampshire and
Georgia statutes. Only by a bald judicial amendment similar to a
legislative enactment can the statute be said not to violate freedom
of speech. There is nothing in the statute to indicate it is limited
to "fighting" words."'
The Brown court said that it would not try to rewrite a statute
which "in no way suggests a saving construction" because "[tlhe
Florida Constitution requires a certain precision defined by the leg-
islature, not legislation articulated by the judiciary.' 4 The court
cited two reasons for this constitutional mandate:
First, if legislative intent is not apparent from the statutory lan-
guage, judicial reconstruction of vague or overbroad statutes could
frustrate the true legislative intent. Second, in some circumstan-
ces, doubts about judicial competence to authoritatively construe
legislation are warranted. Often a court has neither the legislative
fact-finding machinery nor experience with the particular statu-
tory subject matter to enable it to authoritatively construe a stat-
142. 288 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1974).
143. Id. at 246.
144. No. 50,559, slip op. at 5-6 (Fla. April 5, 1978).
145. Id. at 7 (quoting State v. Mayhew, 288 So. 2d 243, 252 (Fla. 1974) (Ervin, J., dissent-
ing)).
146. No. 50,559, slip op. at 8 (Fla. April 5, 1978) (citation omitted).
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ute . . . . The judicial body might question with justification
whether its interpretation is workable or whether it is consistent
with legislative policy which is, as yet, undetermined. 4 '
In a separate opinion, Justice Boyd agreed with the majority's deci-
sion but said they should not have overruled Mayhew. Instead, he
argued that the court should have applied Mayhew as restrictively
construed to the facts of Brown to find that the language used did
not breach the peace.'
The uncertainty of the Florida Supreme Court in evaluating
speech statutes challenged on first amendment grounds is under-
standable given the competing choices. Different policy considera-
tions are implicit in each of the alternatives-restrictively constru-
ing the statute, declaring it unconstitutional as applied, or striking
it as unconstitutional on its face.
Restrictive construction is a device to draw an otherwise unconsti-
tutional statute in such a way as to make it constitutional. To save
an overbroad statute, the United States Supreme Court will define
it to reach only unprotected speech: "fighting words," libel or slan-
der, and obscene speech. But in restricting the range of a statute,
the court may be straying from the intent of the legislature. Judicial
restructuring may defeat a plainly expressed legislative intent. The
judiciary formulates its decisions without the legislative fact-
finding mechanism.
147. Id. (citation omitted).
148. No. 50,559, slip op. at 9 (Fla. Feb. 9, 1978) (Boyd, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). Justices Overton and Adkins agreed with Justice Boyd. Although all three
dissented from the court's second opinion, no dissenting opinion was filed.
Since § 847.04 has been declared unconstitutional, the Florida Legislature may want to
consider drafting a statute similar to Georgia's new abusive or obscene language statute, GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-2610 (Supp. 1976), discussed in note 24 supra.
A three-judge federal district court panel in Tampa earlier refused to declare § 847.04
unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. Stecher v. Askew, 432 F. Supp.
997 (M.D. Fla. 1977). In an opinion written by Circuit Judge Roney, the court refused to grant
injunctive relief to Stecher:
So long as the statute under consideration can be interpreted consistently with the
First Amendment, there is no prospect of injury to plaintiff that calls for the use of
injunctive powers. The statute before us is readily subject to a narrowing construc-
tion. Plaintiff is free to urge that construction on the Florida courts at any point
during a prosecution under the Open Profanity Law.
432 F. Supp. at 1001. The court said that the Florida statute was not like the Georgia statute
declared unconstitutional in Gooding v. Wilson because the Florida statute had been restric-
tively construed only once by the Florida Supreme Court. And, in that interpreting decision,
State v. Mayhew, 288 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1973), the Florida court construed § 847.04 to apply
only to words that are not constitutionally protected, that is, to fighting words.
Such action was in line with the traditional abstention doctrine, which prescribes that a
federal court decline to adjudicate a statute's validity if there is a reasonable "possibility of
limiting interpretation." Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959), quoted in Note, The
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844, 901 (1970).
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Furthermore, by restrictively construing the statute, the court is
leaving the existing language of the overbroad statute in the stat-
utes. If a substantially overbroad statute has the "chilling" effect
on those "whose advice we need,"' 49 then restrictive construction
would not cure the overbreadth problem in the first amendment
area, insofar as individuals and law enforcement officers rely on the
literal statutory language without further guidance. Restrictive con-
struction is weak medicine for the substantially overbroad statute.
So too is the "as applied" method. With this approach the court
evaluates the facts of the case to determine whether the individual's
speech or conduct should be exempt from the prohibitions of the
statute in question. The court evaluates the specific activity using
these criteria: the potential infringement of the freedom of others;
the potential threat to widely held social, political, or moral values;
and the potential stifling of the free flow of an individual's ideas. 50
In contrast to the "as applied" method, which is a specific cure
designed to correct a bad application of the law, the restrictive
construction doctrine is a general cure designed to correct uncertain
words. The "as applied" method reaffirms the language of the stat-
ute as constitutionally sound but attempts to repair constitutionally
infirm language by engrafting a more precise meaning onto ambigu-
ous words.
The weaknesses of the "as applied" method are greater than those
of the restrictive construction doctrine. Under restrictive construc-
tion, the statute's breadth can be narrowed on an abstract level.
With the "as applied" method, the court determines whether the
claimant's speech or conduct should be privileged. But the statute
itself remains intact, a possible trap for the unwary or uninformed.
In contrast, when the court dismantles a statute because it is
facially overbroad, it forces the legislature to focus on the harm
which the statute was designed to prevent. If the legislature wishes
to try again, it must employ means less damaging to first amend-
ment interests in remedying the perceived harm.' 5'
There can be no usurpation of the legislative drafting authority
if the legislature, rather than the judiciary, rewrites the statute to
conform to the constitutional mold. Access to the legislature may
be less expensive to the public than the cost of hiring a skilled
attorney to argue against the reach of an overbroad statute. Those
citizens who can least afford legal services may also be the ones to
benefit from the legislature's wisdom.
149. See 337 So. 2d at 980.
150. See generally The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 148.
151. Id. at 916.
CASE COMMENT
Each of these theories has its place in constitutional adjudication.
It would be to the advantage of the courts, the people, and the
legislature if the court would evolve a thoughtful and consistent
approach to their use. The foregoing considerations suggest the fol-
lowing conclusions.
If the statute requires only minor changes, the court should re-
strictively construe it. Minor constructions of a statute could do
little harm to the legislative intent. And if the legislature is dis-
pleased with the court's interpretation, it can enact a new statute.
If more than minor surgery is required to bring the statute within
constitutional bounds, the court should declare it unconstitutional
on its face for overbreadth. The legislature should be forced to focus
on what conduct or speech it wishes to prohibit.
The Florida Supreme Court has boldly used the doctrine of over-
breadth to strike down a statute regulating speech. If the doctrine
is applied in a similar manner to other statutes, the Florida Legisla-
ture may find itself writing new laws to regulate speech and con-
duct. While the Florida Supreme Court has introduced the concept
of overbreadth into Florida case law, it has left the guidelines of that
concept to be divined from its future writings and from those of the
United States Supreme Court.
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